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Abstract
Business cycles appear to be large, persistent, and asymmetric relative to the
shocks hitting the economy. This observation suggests the existence of an
asymmetric ampliﬁcation and propagation mechanism, which transforms the
shocks into the observed movements in aggregate output. This article demon-
strates, in a small open economy, how credit constraints can be such a
mechanism. The article also shows, however, that the quantitative signiﬁcance
of the ampliﬁcation which credit constraints can provide is sensitive to the
quantitative speciﬁcation of the underlying economy (especially factor shares).
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Over thepast two centuries,aggregate outputin the United
States has grown steadily, but not in a straight line; it has
ﬂuctuated around its upward trend. These output ﬂuctua-
tions have had three key properties:
• Size.Movementsinaggregateoutputhavebeenlarge.
In an economy as big and varied as that of the United
States,movementsinvarioussectorsmightbeexpect-
ed to cancel each other, leaving only small move-
ments in aggregate output. This is not what has hap-
pened.
• Persistence. The output movements have been high-
ly persistent. Once output has fallen below its usual
trend growth, for example, it has stayed below this
trend for some time.
• Asymmetry. Output’s movements have been asym-
metric: downward movements have been sharper
and quicker than upward movements (Falk 1986,
Acemoglu and Scott 1997).
Economists have labeled the recurrent movements in
aggregate output business cycles, but they have not yet
satisfactorily explained why the movements have the par-
ticular properties they do. At least two types of explana-
tions have been offered. One is simply that the economy
has been frequently hit with aggregate shocks which have
these properties. The problem with this explanation is that
sufficiently large shocks like these are hard to ﬁnd in the
data(Summers1986,Cochrane1994).Candidateslikesud-
den changes in government policy, the weather, and oil
supplieshavenotbeenlargeenoughtoaccountforthelarge
movements in aggregate output. The other potential expla-
nationforthebusinesscyclepropertiesisthattheeconomy
has some as yet unidentiﬁed mechanism which transforms
small, barely detectable, shocks to some or all parts of the
economy into large, persistent, asymmetric movements in
aggregate output. This economic mechanism propagates
andampliﬁesshocksinadownwardlybiasedfashion.Here
I argue that the mechanism might be credit constraints, or
limits on how much economic agents can borrow.
Before turning to the formal speciﬁcs of my argument,
let me explain the intuition behind it. Think of an entre-
preneur who is the owner and manager of a ﬁrm which has
two types of assets: savings in a bank account and com-
puterequipment.Assumethattheentrepreneurcannotbor-
row. However, note that the ﬁrm’s scale of production is
optimal;otherwise,theentrepreneurwouldusesomeofthe
ﬁrm’s savings to buy more computer equipment.
Suppose this entrepreneur receives an unanticipated
upward temporary shock to income. Will the entrepreneur
use this income to buy more computers? No, the ﬁrm’s
scale of production is already optimal, so the extra income
will simply be consumed or saved.
Now suppose instead that the entrepreneur receives a
downward shock to income. If the shock is small, the en-
trepreneur will absorb it by reducing the ﬁrm’s savings or
consuming less or both. But if the shock is big enough to
swamp the ﬁrm’s savings, then the entrepreneur must
lower the ﬁrm’s scale of production by selling off some
computer equipment. Note that in this instance, the en-
trepreneur would prefer to borrow, but cannot. If the mar-
ginal returns to computer equipment are diminishing, and
the entrepreneur’s marginal utility is diminishing, then re-
turning to the ﬁrm’s optimal scale of production will take
many periods.
Thus, for an entrepreneur who faces credit constraints,
upward shocks and small downward shocks to income
have little or no effect on production. However, sufficient-
ly large downward shocks can have persistent negative
effects on production. Credit constraints (of virtually any
form) are an asymmetric propagation mechanism.
Still, little in this intuition explains why credit con-
straints should amplify shocks. This is because only cer-
tain types of credit constraints do so. We just considered
an entrepreneur who could not borrow at all. Now suppose
instead that the entrepreneur also owns land, which is a
complementary input with the computer equipment. We
have seen that a downward income shock can lead a
credit-constrained entrepreneur to reduce a ﬁrm’s comput-
erequipment.Supposealargenumberofentrepreneursare
in this situation. Then, because computers and land are
complementary inputs, land prices must fall. This fall will
shrink the debt capacity of the entrepreneurs and lead to a
further shrinkage in production. In this way, certain types
of credit constraints can amplify the effects of income
shocks.
I formalize this argument below. I construct a simple
model in which productive agents use capital and land to
produce output. The agents face a limit on how much they
may borrow and an interest rate that is exogenously speci-
ﬁed. I consider the effects of unanticipated increases or
decreases in the agents’ income. I show that unanticipated
increases have no impact on output. However, sufficiently
largeunanticipateddecreasesinincomereduceoutput,and
after such reductions, output returns only slowly to its
original level.
I then consider two types of credit constraints. First, I
allow agents to borrow up to a ﬁxed exogenous limit. I
show that in this setting, the effects of income shocks are
not ampliﬁed. Second, I allow agents to borrow up to the
value of their land. In this setting, the effects of income
shocks may be greatly ampliﬁed. However, the degree of
ampliﬁcationdependscruciallyonthesharesofcapitaland
land in the production function: if these shares sum to less
than 40 percent (as is approximately true in the U.S. data),
then the effects of income shocks are not ampliﬁed at all.
My work here is essentially a simpler presentation of
ideas originally presented elsewhere, by me and by others.
Many studies have pointed out that in economies with
credit constraints, temporary income shocks can have per-
sistent effects. (See, for example, Scheinkman and Weiss
1986, Kocherlakota 1996, and Cooley, Marimon, and
Quadrini 2000.) Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki
(1998) have emphasized the importance of borrowing lim-
its that depend on asset values as an ampliﬁcation mecha-
nism.
A Simple Model
To start the analysis, I describe a simple model with a
credit constraint. In technical terms, the model is essential-
ly a small open economy version of a neoclassical growth
model with complete depreciation.
I model a group of farmers. The farmers grow a special
type of corn, which can be used equally well for food or
for seed. In each period of time t, a farmer produces corn
according to this production function:(1) Yt = F(Xt,L t)
where Xt is the amount of corn planted last period and Lt
is the amount of land used by the farmer. As is usual, I as-
sume that F is concave and increasing and is as differen-
tiable as I need it to be.
AfarmercansplittheproducedcornYtintoconsumable
sweet corn (Ct) and seed corn (Xt+1) for next period:








−1 − 1 represents the rate that farmers discount fu-
ture utility. Each farmer begins life with X1units of planted
seed corn and one unit of land.
The farmers can borrow and lend corn on the world
market at an interest rate R = β
−1 − 1. They can buy and
sell land in an internal competitive market; the price of
land in terms of corn in period t is denoted by Qt.B yin-
ternal market, I mean that, for legal or other reasons, non-
farmers cannot own land.
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The crucial element of this model is that farmers face
creditconstraints,orborrowinglimits,intheworldmarket.
Let Bt+1 denote the amount of seed corn borrowed by a
typical farmer in period t. I consider two types of borrow-
ing limits. Under the ﬁrst, farmers cannot borrow more
than a ﬁxed amount of debt:
(4) Bt+1 ≤ B*.
I will refer to this borrowing limit as the exogenous credit
constraint.Underthesecondtypeofborrowinglimit,farm-
ers must use their land as collateral when they borrow. In
particular, farmers can disappear without repaying their
debt, but if they do so, they must lose their land. Hence,
thesecondtypeofborrowinglimitsaysthatfarmerscannot
borrow more than the current value of their land holdings:
(5) Bt+1 ≤ QtLt+1.
I will refer to this borrowing limit as the endogenous credit
constraint.
In this economy, farmers take the sequence of land
prices (Qt)
∞






(7) Ct + Xt+1 + QtLt+1 + Bt(1+R)
= F(Xt,L t)+Bt+1 + QtLt
(8) Bt+1 ≤ B* or Bt+1 ≤ QtLt+1
(9) Ct,X t ≥ 0
(10) L1 =1
and X1B1 are given. Note that B1, the initial level of debt,
may be nonzero, so that farmers may begin life in debt or
withpositiveﬁnancialassets.Acollectionofsequences(Q,
C, X, B) is an equilibrium if (Ct,X t,B t) and Lt = 1 solve a
farmer’s problem given Q.
Throughout, I deﬁne the economy’s equilibrium output
to be the farmers’ total production of corn:
(11) Yt = F(Xt,1).
Let’s assume that the economy has been running for a
sufficiently long period of time, so that we can think of it
beginning our analysis in a steady state. Formally, a steady
state is a pair of initial debt and seed corn (Bss,X ss) such
that if B1 = Bss and X1 = Xss, then in equilibrium, for all t,
(12) Xt = Xss,
(13) Bt = Bss.
Solving for the steady state is easy. In a steady state,
because the state variables are constant, a farmer’s con-
sumption of sweet corn must be too. The ﬁrst-order con-
dition for optimal planting of seed corn then implies that
(14) β FX(Xss,1 )=1 .
Suppose a farmer starts with Xss units of seed corn. Over
time, this farmer will use income to pay the interest on
debt B1 (but never the principal), will plant Xss units of
seed corn, and will consume a constant amount of sweet
corn.
Thus, here, together with Xss,any debt level at or below
the borrowing limit is a steady-state level. With the ex-
ogenous constraint, that is, (Bss,X ss) is a steady state if and
only if
(15) Bss ≤ B*
(16) 1 = β FX(Xss,1).
Similarly, with the endogenous constraint, (Bss,X ss)i sa
steady state if and only if
(17) Bss ≤ Qss
(18) 1 = β FX(Xss,1).
Here Qss is the steady-state price of land, which is given by
the present value of the rental payments of land:
(19) Qss = β FL(Xss,1)/(1−β ).
In a steady-state equilibrium, consumption of sweet corn
equals
(20) Css = F(Xss,1) − Xss − BssR
and output equals
(21) Yss = F(Xss,1).
Asymmetry and Persistence
Now I analyze purely unanticipated shocks. In particular,
I assume that the economy begins in a steady state. In the
ﬁrst period, then, in addition to the structure described
above, the farmers receive or lose an additional amount ofincome(∆ unitsofcorn).Theyconfrontnoadditionalposi-
tive or negative income shocks throughout their lifetime.
I analyze the characteristics of the resulting equilibrium.
The interpretation of this exercise is straightforward.
The farmers have acted in the past as if they would never
face an income shock, and then they are unexpectedly
faced with one. The model is sufficiently abstract so that
we can think of this shock in many ways. Most straight-
forwardly, we can think of the farmers receiving unex-
pected revenue or paying an unexpected tax. Or as Kiyo-
taki and Moore (1997) argue, we can think of the shock as
being a consequence of monetary policy. Suppose debt
were purely nominal, and there were a sudden change in
monetary policy. Then, if farmers’ initial debt holdings
were nonzero, there would be an income transfer to or
from them.
In this section, I show that sufficiently large downward
income shocks have persistent effects on the farmers’ out-
put of corn. However, upward shocks have no effect on
that output. I conduct all of the analysis of this section in
the context of the exogenous borrowing limit; the exten-
sion to the endogenous limit is straightforward.
Assume ﬁrst that X1 = Xss and that the shock to income
∆ is positive. What is the nature of the implied equilibri-
um? Here, the economy is essentially equivalent to one in
which farmers begin with a different initial level of debt:
(22) B′1 = B1 − ∆ /(1+R).
But this new lower level of debt B′1 is still part of a steady
state (given that the initial level of planted seed corn is
Xss). Hence, we see that the equilibrium level of output
Yt =F(Xss,1)forallt.Theupwardtemporaryincomeshock
has no impact on output. The farmers simply take the extra
income and use it to pay off some of their debt.
Now assume that the shock to income ∆ is negative.
Here we must consider two separate cases.
Suppose ﬁrst that (B1, X1) is a steady state and B1 < B*.
Suppose that ∆ is small enough that
(23) ∆ /(1+R) ≤ B* − B1.
Then,asabove,thiseconomyisequivalenttooneinwhich
B′1 =B1 +∆ <B*. But this new economy is still in a steady
state, so the resulting level of output is constant at F(Xss,1).
Again, the temporary income shock has no impact on out-
put. Because the shockis temporary, the farmers borrow to
keep their sweet corn consumption constant. But the req-
uisite increase in debt is sufficiently small that they do not
need to reduce their corn planting at all.
Now suppose that, instead, ∆ is sufficiently large that
(24) ∆ /(1+R)>B* − B1.
Now the farmers cannot simply increase their debt level to
smooth out the income shock; the shock is too large. So,
instead, the farmers borrow as much as they can (with Bt =
B* for all t). But this still leaves them with less corn to
consume in the ﬁrst period than they would have had in
the steady state. Thus, they must reduce their seed corn
planting in order to smooth their consumption adequately.
As a result, the economy moves back to its steady state
along a transition path. The resulting equilibrium values
(C, B, X) satisfy the following conditions:
(25) β FX(Xt+1,1)/Ct+1 =1 / Ct
(26) Bt = B*
for t >1 ;a n d
(27) C1 + X2 = F(Xss,1) − B1(1+R)+B* − ∆
(28) Ct + Xt+1 = F(Xt,1) − B*R
for t > 1. The standard arguments about transitions in the
neoclassical growth model imply that for all t >1
(29) Yt < Yt+1 < F(Xss,1)
(30) limt→∞ Yt = F(Xss,1).
The large downward temporary shock to income thus
introduces an immediate shock to output. However, the
economy recovers only slowly from this shock back to the
steady-state level of output; the shock has persistent ef-
fects.
We can summarize this analysis simply. Temporary
upward income shocks, no matter what their size, have no
effects on output. Temporary downward shocks do have
persistent effects on output, but only if the shocks are
sufficiently large. Clearly, then, credit constraints are an
asymmetric propagation mechanism.
Ampliﬁcation
To be a mechanism capable of creating business cycles,
however, credit constraints must also be able to amplify
the effects of income shocks, to transform small income
shocks into large movements in output. In this section, I
consider how credit constraints might do that. Because of
the preceding analysis, we know that we can ignore up-
wardshocks.Iassumethattheinitialdebtholdingsaresuf-
ﬁciently large that the borrowing limit holds with equality.
This means that any downward shock (regardless of its
size) triggers a persistent response in output.
Before tackling the main issue, though, we must decide
how to measure ampliﬁcation (versus persistence). I will
deﬁne the ampliﬁcation of a downward shock ∆ to be how
far output in the second period (Y2) is from the steady-state
output level, relative to the size of the original shock ∆ .I n
other words, if the initial shock is of size ∆ , then the am-
pliﬁcation is given by
(31) Y2(∆ ) − Yss /∆ =(Y2 − Yss /Yss)/(∆ /Yss).
Note that the assumption that the credit constraint initially
holds with equality tends to magnify the degree of ampliﬁ-
cation. Otherwise, as we have seen, the farmers can offset
someoftheshockbyborrowingmoreratherthanchanging
the level of planting.
An Exogenous Constraint
Consider ﬁrst what happens with an exogenous credit con-
straint.
As above, I assume here that B1 =B*, that X1 =Xss,and
that there is a negative shock −∆ to ﬁrst period income. Tobe concrete, I assume that F(X, L)=X
α 1L
α 2, where the
capital and land shares α 1 + α 2 ≤ 1. (As it turns out, the
land share value α 2 is irrelevant with the exogenous credit
constraint because land is inelastically supplied.)
In this world, the evolution of sweet corn consumption











(33) Ct + Xt+1 + RB* = X
α
t
1 + ε t
(34) X1 = Xss
where the shock ε t=−∆ if t= 1 and 0 otherwise. For small
∆ , these equations are well-approximated by this system:
(35) ct = ct+1 +( 1 −α 1)xt+1
(36) ctCss/Xss + xt+1 = β
−1α 1xt
for t >1 ;a n d
(37) c1Css/Xss + x2 = −∆ /Xss
where (ct,x t)≡ (ln(Ct/Css), ln(Xt/Xss)). Substituting out for
ct gives a second-order difference equation in xt,for t>1 :
(38) x3 +[ −1 − β
−1 − (1−α 1)Css/Xss]x2 = ∆ /Xss
(39) xt+2 +[ −1 − β
−1 − (1−α 1)Css/Xss]xt+1 + β
−1xt =0 .
The characteristic polynomial of the second-order dif-
ference equation is
(40) z
2 +[ −1 − β
−1 − (1−α 1)Css/Xss]z + β
−1
and this polynomial has two roots. One of these roots is
larger than β
−1, and the other lies in the set [α 1,1). The
former root is irrelevant because it leads to a path for xt
that is explosive. (Technically, it violates a transversality
condition.) Label the latter root γ . Then we know that, for
t >1 ,
(41) xt+2 = γ xt+1
(42) x3 +[ −1 − β
−1 − (1−α 1)Css/Xss]x2 = ∆ /Xss.
Substituting equation (41) into (42), we get that
(43) y2 = α 1x2
= −α 1βγ∆ /Xss
= −γ∆ /Yss.
Thus, the ampliﬁcation of ∆ is given by γ .
How does γ depend on B*? To understand this depen-
dence, note from (16) and (20) that




−1 − (RB*/Xss) − 1.
When B* is high, Css/Xss is low, because the farmers are
spending most of their income servicing their debt. Con-
versely, when B* is low, Css/Xss is high. In particular, if
B* = 0, then Css/Xss =α
−
1
1β −1 −1 and, by the quadratic for-
mula, γ =α 1.I fB*is so high that Css/Xss is essentially zero,
then(againbythequadraticformula)γ iswell-approximat-
ed by 1.
Thus, the upper bound for ampliﬁcation is 1, and the
lower bound is α 1. With the exogenous credit constraint,
the shock to farmers’income does not get ampliﬁed at all.
An Endogenous Constraint
Iturnnowtotheendogenouscreditconstraintunderwhich
the farmers cannot borrow more than the value of their
land. We naturally expect the ampliﬁcation to be greater
with such a constraint than with an exogenous constraint.
Why? When farmers get a negative shock to their income,
they lower their seed corn holdings Xt below Xss for all t.
Becauseseedcornandlandarecomplementaryinputs,this
decrease must lead to a fall in the value of land. Hence, the
farmers’ borrowing constraint tightens. This, in turn, cre-
ates a need for a further decline in seed corn levels. Thus,
the endogenous credit constraint creates an interaction be-
tweendebtcapacityandtheincomeshock.Thisinteraction
multiplies the effect of the income shock.
While the qualitative impact of the endogenous credit
constraint is clear, its quantitative impact is not. Here, as
above, I assume that the initial level of debt is such that the
borrowing limit holds with equality. Therefore,
(45) 1 = β FX(Xss,1)
(46) B1 = β FL(Xss,1)/(1−β ).
Again, I emphasize that this initial level of debt means that
any downward income shock has a persistent effect on
output. I parameterize F(X, L)=X
α 1L
α 2.
The equilibrium evolution of (Ct,X t,Q t) in this setting
satisﬁes the following system of equations: The resource
constraint (47), where ε t = ∆ if t = 1 and 0 otherwise,
(47) Ct + Xt+1 + (1+R)Bt = X
α
t
1 + Bt+1 − ε t;





























a borrowing limit (50) that binds throughout the transition,
(50) Bt+1 = Qt;
and the initial conditions for debt (51) and seed corn (52),
(51) B1 = βα 2X
α 1
ss /(1−β )
(52) X1 = Xss.
In the Appendix, I derive a log-linear approximation to
this system of equations. I ﬁnd that for small ∆ ,
(53) Y2− Yss ≈ −α 1(1−α 1β )∆ /(1−α 2−α 1β )
(54) Q1 − Qss ≈ −α 1(1−β )∆ /(1−α 2−α 1β ).
Note that if α 2 = 0, then the ampliﬁcation of the effect of
the income shock on output is α 1, which is the same as
when farmers cannot borrow at all.
2These formulas show that the endogenous credit con-
straint can generate an arbitrarily high degree of ampliﬁca-
tion. Given the capital share α 1, output ampliﬁcation is a
strictlyincreasingfunctionofthelandshareα 2.Ampliﬁca-
tion is bounded above by (1−β )
−1 and achieves this upper
bound when α 1 = 0 and α 2 = 1. Hence, by setting α 2 and
β sufficiently close to 1 and α 1 sufficiently close to 0, we
can, theoretically, generate arbitrarily high degrees of am-
pliﬁcation.
Butthistheoreticalpossibilityisnotrobust.Speciﬁcally,
suppose we parameterize F(X, L)=X
α 1L
0.4−α 1, so that the
economy has another inelastically supplied input (for ex-
ample, labor) with a share of 0.6. In the accompanying ta-
ble, I display the results of setting β = 0.97 and calculating
the degree of ampliﬁcation (of land prices and output) for
different values of capital share.
3 For these parameteriza-
tions, the price of land does not respond much to the in-
come shock. The results are now similar to those with the
exogenous constraint, when the degree of ampliﬁcation is
well-approximated by α 1.
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Thus,again,itistheoreticallypossibleforsmallincome
shocks to lead to arbitrarily large output movements in a
world with endogenous credit constraints. However, this
possibility is not robust.
Anticipated Shocks
So far, I have assumed that farmers’ income shocks are
not anticipated. What happens if, instead, the farmers are
faced with independent and identically distributed shocks
to their income over time? (Assume that all farmers are
hit with the same realizations of the shocks.) In this sec-
tion, I provide an intuitive answer to that question (with-
out going through analytical speciﬁcs).
The key to understanding the farmers’behavior is to re-
alize that when they are deciding how much savings to
maintain, farmers must balance two considerations: how
impatient they are relative to the market interest rate and
how likely they are to run into a borrowing constraint
which would lead them to a suboptimal level of produc-
tion.
Suppose ﬁrst that β (1+R) = 1. Then the farmers are
marginally indifferent about when they consume; their pri-
mary consideration is to avoid the borrowing constraint.
They will accumulate savings in order to avoid the pos-
sibility of ever running into the borrowing constraint. In
the limit, their savings will be inﬁnite (as demonstrated in
Sotomayor 1984), and no income shock will have any ef-
fect on their production levels.
If β (1+R) < 1, however, then the farmers’ behavior is
different. Their savings will bounce around stochastically;
and with somepositive probability, the farmers will endup
constrained by their borrowing limit (after a sufficiently
long run of bad shocks). In states of the world in which the
farmers are unconstrained, the response to income shocks
will be similar to that which we saw for unanticipated
shocks. Upward shocks or small downward shocks will
have no effect on the level of seed planting. However,
large downward shocks will run farmers into their borrow-
ing constraint and generate persistent effects on output.
If the farmers are constrained (as they are with positive
probability),thentheirseedplantingwillbebelowXss.Up-
ward income shocks will lead to an increase in the scale of
production; downward income shocks, to a decrease in the
scale of production. Both types of shocks will have per-
sistent effects. However, because of curvature in marginal
utility, the effect of downward shocks on output will be
larger than the effect of upward shocks (Aiyagari 1994).
Even if shocks are anticipated, endogenous credit con-
straints lead to more ampliﬁcation than exogenous credit
constraints. How much more is an open question.
Conclusion
Macroeconomics is looking for an asymmetric ampliﬁca-
tionandpropagationmechanismthatcanturnsmallshocks
to the economy into the business cycle ﬂuctuations we ob-
serve: large, persistent, downwardly biased movements in
aggregate income. I have argued that credit constraints are
potentiallysuchamechanism.However,Ihaveshownthat
the degree of ampliﬁcation provided by credit constraints
seems to depend crucially on the parameters of the econo-
my. This sets up a clear challenge for future work: to dem-
onstrate, in a carefully calibrated model environment, that
the ampliﬁcation and propagation possible by credit con-
straints are quantitatively signiﬁcant.
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A lot is at stake here. For if credit constraints can be
shown to be signiﬁcant in this way, then our understanding
of macroeconomic policy must be modiﬁed in at least two
fundamental ways.
One is that our view of the effects of ﬁscal and mone-
tary policy must change; these effects may be much larger
than our purely aggregate models predict. We have seen
that in a world with credit constraints, the distribution of
income is a key determinant of output. Especially if credit
constraintsareendogenous,changesinﬁscalandmonetary
policy thattrigger small changes inthe income distribution
can lead to big, persistent changes in aggregate output.
Related to that issue is our view of how the joint dis-
tribution of assets and productivity affects the impact of
shocks (including policy shocks) on the economy. Consid-
er, for a concrete example, a question often posed in policy
circles: If the stock market were to drop drastically be-
cause a bubble burst, what would happen to aggregate out-
put? According to my analysis here, the answer depends
crucially on how close productive agents are to their bor-
rowing limits. If agents have a lot of savings outside the
stock market, then such a shock would lead to just a slight
dip in output. But if productive agents are quite close to
theirborrowinglimits,thenthisshockcoulddepressoutput
dramatically.
*The author thanks V. V. Chari, Harold Cole, and Patrick Kehoe for their com-
ments, which greatly improved the article. The author also thanks Kathy Rolfe for ex-
cellent editorial assistance.
1This restriction simpliﬁes the analysis (and exaggerates the effects of credit con-
straints) because it prevents farmers from using land, as well as debt, as a buffer against
adverse shocks.
2The log-linearization also shows that the degree of persistence is α 1, in the sense
that (Yt−Yss)/Yss ≈α 1(Yt−1−Yss)/Yss for t >3 .
3V. V. Chari has emphasized to me that it could well be interesting to explore
speciﬁcationsoftheaggregateproductionfunctioninwhichtheelasticityofsubstitution
between land and labor is less than 1. Such speciﬁcations could lead to bigger land
price swings, even when the land share is relatively small.
4Some readers may be concerned that this table neglects nontrivial second-order
dynamics. To check for this possibility, I used a shooting method to compute a more
precise approximation. If I assume that ∆ = Yss/100 and that the system returns to
steady state in 80 periods, then the ampliﬁcation of output is within 0.001 of what is
reported in the table.
5To this end, I have computed numerical solutions to versions of my model in
which depreciation isless than fulland inwhich theendogenous creditconstraint isfor-
mulated in terms of capital rather than land. Making these changes seems to reduce the
ability of the model to generate quantitatively signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation.Appendix
Approximating the Ampliﬁcation With
an Endogenous Credit Constraint
InthisAppendix,Ideriveanapproximationfortheampliﬁcation
ofthe effectsofthe incomeshockon outputwhenagents facean
endogenous credit constraint. Here I use lowercase characters to
refer to deviations of logged variables from steady states; thus,
xt = ln(Xt/Xss).
To start, recall that
(A1) Qss/Yss = α 2β /(1−β )




−1(1−α 2) − 1
(A3) Xss/Yss = α 1β .
The log-linearized transition equations are
(A4) ct = ct+1 +( 1 −α 1)xt+1
(A5) qtβ
−1Qss = qt+1Qss + α 2β
−1xt+1Xss
both for t ≥ 1;
(A6) ctCss + xt+1Xss + β
−1qt−1Qss = β
−1xtXss + qtQss
for t >1 ;a n d
(A7) c1Css + x2Xss = q1Qss − ∆ .
By substituting (A5) into (A6), we get, for t > 1, that














By substituting (A5) into (A6), we get, for t > 1, that







By combining (A7) and (A8), we get that
(A10) ζ (L
−1)qt−1 =0
for t > 1, where L




































Thecharacteristic polynomialζ has threerealroots. Oneroot
is β
−1, a second is at least as large as β
−1, and the third is α 1.
We can ignore the ﬁrst two roots, because they lead qt to violate
the transversality condition. Hence, for t ≥ 1,
(A12) qt+1 = α 1qt.
By substituting this result into (A4)–(A7), we ﬁnd that









−1−α 1)q1Qss = −∆ + q1Qss










−1−α 1)q1 + α 1q1Qss.
Combining terms, we get that
(A16) [ζ (α 1) − α
−
2








and, since ζ (α 1)=0 ,
















































= −α 1(∆ /Yss)(1−α 1β )/(1−α 2−α 1β )
(A20) q1 =( ∆ /Yss)(Yss/Qss)α 2α 1/(α 1+β
−1α 2−β
−1)




= −(∆ /Yss)(1−β )α 1/(1−α 1β −α 2).
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23–27.Potential Ampliﬁcation of an Income Shock
With Various Capital Share Values
When   = 0.97 and  2 = 0.4 –  1
Ampliﬁcation of Effect on
Value of
Capital Share Land Price Output
( 1)( Q1 – Qss)  
–1 IQss (Y2 – Yss )  
–1 IYss
0.3 .008 .349
0.2 .006 .266
0.1 .004 .150